Assumptions about justice underlie much of the political turmoil that threatens the peace of our society and our continued enjoyment of political freedom. But the spirit of Socrates warns us this is no easy task, for we must work to attain some clear, rich, wise understanding of what justice is before we can well answer the question of whether it is a single ideal pursued by all, or a mere human convention.

Our modern approach to justice is significantly different from that of the past, especially because our political theory is based on the idea of natural rights. Our passionate commitment to rights, as admirable as it may be, can make it difficult for us to think well about justice. What used to be considered matters of charity or of social good, such as caring for the sick or attaining education, are now considered matters of right and justice. As Pope Leo states in his recently released Dilexi te, “For the Christian faith, the education of the poor is not a favor but a duty. Children have a right to knowledge as a fundamental requirement for the recognition of human dignity.” I was surprised to find that Mortimer Adler’s Paideia Proposal repeatedly affirms John Dewey’s insistence in Democracy and Education that excellent education in a democracy is not only a universal need but a universal right: 

A revolutionary message of that book was that a democratic society must provide equal educational opportunity…by making sure to give all of them, all with no exceptions, the same quality of education. The ideal that Dewey set before us is a challenge we have failed to meet. 

According to the Proposal, all children must be given the best education; offering it to some and not to all is “a downright violation of our democratic principles.”

But does the use of rights language illuminate or merely muddle both the question and our efforts? In most cases, the claims seem likely to arouse passion but provide little concrete content. As Professor Randall Smith of the University of St. Thomas in Houston recently complained: “A claim of a right outweighs most cost-benefit analyses; that’s why people claim them so often. Once you say you have a right, the conversation is supposed to be over.”

Our classical instincts rightly tell us that if we want to be wise today, we need to ground our thought about justice in the wisdom of the past. Classical Academic Press’s The Justice Reader issues a “call to study” and provides important resources from a wide variety of the sources of our traditions to begin that endeavor. 

I want to make a particular pitch for a serious study of the thought of Thomas Aquinas on justice. In his Summa Theologiae, he provides a comprehensive and profound digest of the ancient and medieval, pagan and Christian wisdom on the topic, with the unique clarity of one of the greatest teachers. Between his treatments of law, justice, and its related virtues and vices, he presents us with over 500 articles meticulously organized into 85 questions.

In reference to this particular disputed question, Thomas can help us see why things might look unequal while still being just through several key distinctions. The distinction between commutative and distributive justice is particularly pertinent to our question. When we think of what is just, we often think of simple equality - equal pay for equal work. But according to distributive justice, equality is proportional - those who are more important get more, as a general in an army versus a private, or Michael Jordan versus Steve Kerr. Disagreements about the basis of importance lead to disputed claims about what is just. This is the heart of the conflict between Agamemnon and Achilles - Achilles fails to accept the social basis of Agamemnon’s honors, while Agamemnon fails to honor the heroic basis of Achilles’ claims. In a society that values wealth more than anything, it might be just for those who generate the most wealth to receive preferential treatment.

In his treatment of human law, Aquinas points out that the natural law is determined by human governments, in different ways that fit their different circumstances. Yet when they do so in virtue of the natural law, what they establish is truly just, even though different from other societies. Differences in voter eligibility requirements might each be just, given different circumstances. Thomas acknowledges that, in determining the natural law, human cannot usually achieve the ideal, but must be limited by what is possible: 

Human law is framed for a number of human beings, the majority of whom are not perfect in virtue. Wherefore human laws do not forbid all vices, from which the virtuous abstain, but only the more grievous vices, from which it is possible for the majority to abstain. 

In this sense, the American Constitution did indeed “establish justice”, though Benjamin Franklin could only say (in a short speech of practical wisdom that all should hear today), “Thus I consent, Sir, to this Constitution because I expect no better….” So, in this sense, human justice, though never ideal, is yet real. And individually, we can strive to build up the virtue of justice in ourselves (which provides the whole framework for Thomas’s treatment) into a light that shines before all.

In looking for wisdom about matters relating to justice, we should not neglect the foundational commentaries on law. Our notion of natural and political rights emerged out of this tradition. Making the ideal of justice as real as possible in courts of law has always been the unique business of jurists, and it has commanded the thought of some of the greatest and noblest minds in our tradition, who have produced their own “summae” of the collective wisdom of millennia. For this reason, in past times the study of law was “viewed as a branch of a general cultured education, rather than solely as a prelude to a profession.” (This is from an article on James Wilson, a founding father and member of the Supreme Court, whose Lectures on Law delivered to George Washington and the first Congress witness to the classical grounding of American legal and political wisdom.)

We desperately need a wise account of justice that incorporates the modern developments of political and social theory, which have made our beautiful life of freedom possible, into that wisdom. Perhaps God is using our educational efforts to help prepare for those who will one day provide it. 

Andrew T. Seeley, PhD, is Director of Advanced Formation for Educators at the Augustine Institute and President of the Boethius Institute for the Advancement of Liberal Education.

 

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