The most pressing perennial political query that entangles interlocutors in the most challenging of conversations, the question essentially at the heart of every serious political discussion is: What is Justice?
And this persistent question, and the consequent and enduring conversation about the nature of justice - whether justice is a universal ideal or a social construct – is by no means a new one. In fact, it is the question that drives the dialogue in Plato’s Republic, the subtitle of which is On the Just. The impetus for Socrates’ conversation about justice in the Republic is his promise to Plato to converse with his younger brother, Glaucon, about his ambition to compete for a leadership role in political life, before his family believes he is prepared for the challenges and dangers of such a pursuit. Plato’s hope, as the story goes, is that Socrates will find the means to deter Glaucon from his political path or, at least, to moderate his ambition. The premise of Socrates’ conversation with Glaucon is that he must understand what Justice is in order to lead the city well. It is not surprising then that it is Glaucon’s challenge to Socrates that becomes the basis for the entire conversation in the Republic.
Glaucon is a young man, ambitious to make his mark on Athenian political life. After listening to multiple conversations at the beginning of the dialogue about what justice is, all clearly engineered by Socrates to engage him in the dialogue, Glaucon can no longer contain himself. The sophists, like Thrasymachus in the Republic, teach the young that “Justice” is the advantage of the stronger, that the strong make the rules and rule where they can, while the weak submit where they must. Glaucon is tempted by this argument.
To illustrate that even the weak believe justice is a myth used by the strong to subject them to their will and interest, Glaucon recounts the famous story of the ring of Gyges. Gyges is a simple shepherd who discovers a ring that grants him the power of invisibility, which he uses to conspire with the king’s wife to kill the king, usurp his power and wealth, and rule unchallenged. Glaucon contends that, like the shepherd, the multitude of people in Athens would take advantage of others and commit injustice if they believed they could enjoy the benefits of unlimited power without paying any penalty. It is thus not surprising that Glaucon is concerned about understanding the truth about justice. Why should he be just if justice is only a social construct employed by the strong to live well to the detriment of the weak? Glaucon and his brother, Adeimantus challenge Socrates to prove to them that the good one attains from living a just life is entirely choice-worthy, even if it requires the sacrifice of the worldly quest for power, fame, and fortune.
The resulting discussion in the dialogue pursues a description of a just city in speech, from which Socrates promises to extrapolate a definition of justice as noble and good for the individual as well as for the city. The first iteration of the just city, a “healthy” city, founded on the satisfaction of the simplest physical and economic human needs through market exchange, falters when disrupted by Glaucon’s demand for a city that takes into account his desire (and more generally the human desire) for more. In this way, Plato reveals to us that the greatest challenge to establishing a just society is eros, the disruptive human longing for more.
Justice can only exist in the city and the soul of a human being, Socrates contends, when the proper order exists in both. According to Socrates, the soul and the city must be governed by the judgement of wisdom, which harnesses and educates those characterized most of all by spiritedness and the virtue of courage, to moderate and manage the unruly forces of eros. The challenge is that the wisest human beings, contrary to popular opinion, most often prefer not to engage in political life. In Book 2 of the Republic, Socrates explains to Glaucon that the best human beings must be persuaded to serve the public good, not by the promise of wealth or honor, but to avoid the negative penalty of rule by the ambitious who are less wise and good. It is Socrates’ contention that we should only consent to the governance of the reluctant and prudent leaders, who privilege the common good over their own interest.
When we teach the Republic to our students, we often – and justifiably so – focus on the allegory of the cave in Book 7. And yet it is in Book 6 that Socrates responds most directly to Glaucon’s challenge. There, Socrates explains that the best natures (among whom Glaucon might see himself) must receive the most serious and careful education. Without proper formation, the gifted can do the greatest harm to cities, susceptible as they would be to the corruption of the political forces of the city, which hope to use the talented for their own purposes. The danger to the city is that turned towards the study of the good things, this talented human being withdraws from the tumult of political life altogether. Socrates likens him to a man in a storm, who seeks shelter from the dust and the rain under a little wall. This person prefers the quiet obscurity of his own solitude, to be left alone with his own thoughts, rather than to find himself caught up in the lawless political maelstrom whirling around him.
At the end of the allegory of the cave, Socrates contends that the most wise and good human beings must be compelled to return to that political maelstrom out of a sense of duty to educate the young and to guard the city against the dangerous passions of those ambitious for power and wealth. This sort of human being sacrifices the quiet pursuit of wisdom and virtue his soul desires to serve the public good. For Socrates, then, justice is both real and good, but not easily available to human beings, whose passions and ambitions, small and great, serve to disrupt the political order. In the end, we often – at best – must settle for the moderate, a less lofty but more attainable approximation of the fully just.

Carol McNamara, PhD, is Director of the Great Hearts Institute for Classical Education.
Get Involved with The Disputed Question
If you’re enjoying the essays and want to respond with your own charitable and respectful thoughts, objections, and responses, you have two options.
-
Public Engagement: Beneath each essay, you'll find a comment box, where you can post comments to be read publicly.
- Direct Author Engagement: Use the form on The Disputed Question page to send your message to the contributing authors on any topic. Those authors may choose to respond to you directly, but may instead reference your ideas in future submissions.


Be the first to comment